The activities of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
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How the rules applied by the MDBs address public information, consultation and participation is outside the scope of this contribution, which focuses on their grievance mechanism as a means of public participation. On the public participation dimensions of MDB safeguards and policies, see especially the very detailed analysis in D. D. Bradlow, M. S. Chapman, 'Public Participation and the Private Sector: The Role of Multilateral Development Banks in the Evolution of International Legal Standards ', Erasmus Law Review, vol. 4, 2011, pp. 89-123. 2 For comparative studies of MDB accountability mechanisms, see R. E. Bissell, S. Nanwani, 'Multilateral Development Bank Accountability Mechanisms: Developments and Challenges ', Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 6, 2009, of the CAO Operating Guidelines inter alia clarify the vocabulary, replacing the 'ombudsman' function with a 'dispute resolution' function and relabeling 'compliance audit' as 'compliance investigation'.
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Activities of the ADB can be examined by an Accountability Mechanism that was created in 2003 to replace the Inspection Committee created in [1995] [1996] . The Accountability Mechanism was revised in May 2012 and includes both a Special Project Facilitator (SPF) which acts as a mediation forum where project-affected people can file complaints regardless of whether the ADB's operational policies and procedures have been breached or not, and a Compliance Review Panel (CRP) that examines complaints based on an alleged breach of ADB policies and procedures. The 2012 review process dropped the requirement that affected people start with the consultation process before they can file for a compliance review.
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The EBRD created an Independent Recourse Mechanism in 2003. It was replaced in 2010 by the Project Complaint Mechanism (PCM), which has both a compliance review mission and a problem-solving function, depending on whether the complaint is assessed as eligible for a compliance review, a problem-solving initiative, or both. The PCM Rules of Procedure were updated in May 2014. This update does not result in significant procedural changes but intends to clarify a number of provisions. In the framework of the AfDB, the Independent Review Mechanism (IRM) entrusted to a Compliance Review and Mediation Unit (CRMU) was set up in 2004 and modified in 2010. Like the EBRD mechanism, it has a twofold (problem-solving/compliance review) structure that can lead to a compliance review, a problem-solving initiative, or both.
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Finally, the Complaints Mechanism of the EIB was created in 2008 and revised in 2010. It offers the possibility to access mediation, or compliance control, or mediation followed by compliance control if mediation is unsuccessful. The grievance mechanism has an additional procedural level that consists in the possibility of an appeal before the European Ombudsman if requesters are not satisfied with the EIB Complaint Mechanism's findings. 10 This paper will refer only marginally to the EIB Complaint Mechanism, since it is the most opaque of its kind.
11

B. HARM: THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS
The MDB grievance mechanisms address grievances from people who are affected or likely to be adversely affected by projects supported by (one or more) MDB. Hence 'the public' as such is not eligible to submit a request. Who these eligible, 'project-affected people' are depends on the specific eligibility requirements of each grievance mechanism. One should also note that the identity of 'project-affected people' is not limited to who the Management of the concerned bank decided they were during the design, appraisal and/or implementation of the project. The MDB grievance mechanisms are empowered to look beyond the project definitions and can find that people who were left outside 12 the project's design/appraisal/implementation process are nonetheless eligible to participate in a problem-solving exercise and/or compliance review.
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Either because some people were 'forgotten' or the project's area of influence was defined too narrowly with regard to the actual zone of impact. 13
Regarding the Inspection Panel, see for example Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project (Bangladesh, 1996) Regardless of the specificities of each grievance mechanism's eligibility requirements, harm-whether already occurring or potential-appears as the central concern, even more than the breach of an applicable internal rule of the MDB. It is therefore not surprising that all MDB grievance mechanisms offer a combination of problem-solving techniques-mediation, good offices, consultation, etc.-and compliance review (except for the Inspection Panel, which has exclusively a compliance-control function). Likewise, access to a grievance mechanism's problem-solving function is not conditioned on a claim that the alleged harm stems from a breach of an applicable rule. Only the Inspection Panel, the Independent Review Mechanism (AfDB) and the MICI (IDB) require that the harm be a consequence of an action or omission of the concerned MDB, in breach of applicable policies and procedures. In addition, only the MICI (IDB) requires that claimants go through a problem-solving exercise, that it be unsuccessful and that a breach of policies and procedures is alleged, before accessing compliance review.
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C. PECULIARITIES OF THE COMPLIANCE REVIEW FUNCTION
The terms of the compliance review function of MDB grievance mechanisms show they are distinctively tailored to the kind of institutions (international organisations) and activities concerned, especially when it comes to the rules by which compliance is assessed and the possible outcomes of a compliance review.
As for the applicable rules, they are, according to the terminology of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIOs), 15 the 'rules of the organization'. The legal nature of such internal rules is highly contentious; there is indeed no consensus on whether they constitute part of international law, or can bind only the organisation's staff. 16 The DARIOs (Article 64) specify that unless the lex specialis of an organisation provides otherwise, the breach of an organisation's rules can amount to an internationally wrongful act only if those rules 'are part of international law' and, what is more, 'while the rules of the organization may affect international obligations for the relations between an organization and its members, they cannot have a similar effect in relation to non-members'. 17 All in all, with respect to project-affected people, the only thing that is sure is that operational policies and procedures are rules made by and for MDBs and are thus not subject to judicial settlement. The one exception is the situation of the EIB: it is a product of the State members of the European Union alone, and is an organ of the EU. As such, it must comply with the entirety of the obligations the EU itself has committed to. In particular, it must comply with the European regulation that transposes the international obligations binding the European Union under the Aarhus Convention on Public Information, Public Participation, and Access to Environmental Justice.
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The rules that can be invoked before each MDB grievance mechanism is thus defined by each MDB, and whether a particular rule can be invoked is specified in the grievance mechanism's rules of procedure and/or in the rules themselves. Rules related to fraud/corruption 19 and procurement, for example, can generally not be invoked.
Some grievance mechanisms distinguish between the rules that can be invoked when the project is public/ sovereign-guaranteed and those which are relevant for projects that are private/non-sovereign guaranteed;
The ADB Accountability Mechanism previously had a similar requirement; it was dropped in the 2012 revision. the second are called performance requirements (EBRD), performance standards (IFC), operational safeguards (AfDB), or safeguard requirements (ADB). References to international law that might be included in these rules are addressed in more detail in the second part of this chapter.
As for the outcomes of compliance reviews, they differ quite substantially from those offered through judicial processes. The MDB grievance mechanisms do not record wrongful acts under international law that would be attributable to the bank, and they do not decide on a responsibility based on the lex specialis of the bank. When a bank is found non-compliant, it does not result in a legal implication or compensation for the victims. Compliance-control generally leads to the adoption of remedial measures, so as to allow the project to carry on on a basis more respectful of affected people. Grievance mechanisms' findings can also result in improvements to the applicable policies and safeguards. 
II. ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATED TO WATER AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The MDB's policies and safeguards (or procedures, or requirements) refer to-both hard and soft-international law, though direct and specific references are usually found in the safeguard/performance requirements aimed at borrowers. That does not mean that the MDBs' standards are less protective than international law; they are indeed much more detailed than most international law obligations, and this degree of precision allows grievance mechanisms to exercise in-depth control and review.
A. REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN MDBS' STANDARDS
First, compliance with the international law obligations that the borrower country has committed to, or that are in force in the country where the project of a private borrower is located, can be mentioned in broad terms as a condition for the validity of certain documents without which the bank will not support the project. For example, the World Bank Operational Policy 4.01 on Environmental Assessment (EA) specifies that the 'borrower is responsible for carrying out the EA' 35 and that the 'EA takes into account...transboundary and global environmental aspects...and obligations of the country, pertaining to project activities, under relevant international environmental treaties and agreements. The Bank does not finance project activities that would contravene such country obligations, as identified during the EA.' Regarding direct references to international law in normative instruments aimed at the banks' staff, they are usually found in the strategies of the institution, which cannot be invoked before MDB's grievance mechanisms.
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One can nevertheless find direct mentions, either in general obligations-'ADB will not finance projects that do not comply with...the host country's social and environmental laws and regulations, including those laws implementing host country obligations under international law' 43 -or through the quotation of specific texts, (South Africa, 2010), supra, n. 13, pp. 4-8 and 11-14. 43 ADB Safeguard Policy Statement, 2013, para. 6 
B. MADE-TO-MEASURE STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE-CONTROL
Though international law related to public participation influences the content of MDBs' standards-in some cases quite substantially, as in the EBRD example-one must keep in mind that these standards are above all tailored to the specific constraints of MDBs' activities and the concrete issues arising in the design, appraisal and/or implementation of development projects. They go far more into detail than any rule of international law, in turn allowing the compliance-control mechanisms to assess the way Management has complied with its obligations with a remarkable degree of case by case precision. For instance, the MDBs' environmental impact assessment policies and procedures provide for the actions the banks' staff must take during the project's lifecycle step by step, and their associated safeguards or performance requirements detail what is expected from the borrower, when and how. As regards the participation of affected or potentially affected people, MDBs' standards and grievance mechanisms are by far more practical than general international law and international judicial dispute settlement, at least in comparison to the approach in the 
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In contrast, MDB grievance mechanisms rely on standards' 'substance and spirit' 49 to check up on the quality and quantity of information disclosed, as well as on the number and identity of the stakeholders able to participate in consultations. They also enter into the detail of actions and omissions of the Management to determine whether affected people were effectively informed and involved, including actions and omissions in Management's supervision of the borrower's own commitments.
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In addition, even a cursory glance at the corpus of standards of each MDB reveals that the banks have created a series of obligations that cannot be found in international law, such as standards on safeguards that the private sector must live up to, 51 on financial intermediaries, project-level grievance mechanisms-intended both to ease access for project-affected people and to make interventions more timely-, cumulative impacts and so on. All these may be subject to MDBs grievance mechanisms' in-depth control. Ibid., para. 205: 'it is the view of the Court that it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the project, the specific content of the environmental impact assessment required in each case, having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment. The Court also considers that an environmental impact assessment must be conducted prior to the implementation of a project. Moreover, once operations have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken. ' 48 Ibid., Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project (Bangladesh, 1996) , supra, n. 13, para. 47. 50
A. Naudé Fourie, supra, n. ', International Organizations Law Review, vol. 10, 2014, pp. 3-80. Finally, on rare occasions, the MDB grievance mechanisms also refer to international law in situations where the applicable standards do not. This occurred, for example, in the Chad pipeline case, where the Inspection Panel, concerned with allegations of massive violations of human rights, 'felt obliged to examine whether the issues of proper governance or human rights violations in Chad were such as to impede the implementation of the Project in a manner compatible with the Bank's policies'.
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• • •
Do the MDB grievance mechanisms promote public participation in water resources management? They undoubtedly fill international justiciability gaps, given that they are the only remedy available to people who believe MDBs are responsible for the harms they suffered as a result of bank-supported development projects.
Yet 'justiciability' here should not be understood narrowly as an access to purely legal remedies but rather as an access to justice in the broad sense. The grievance mechanisms contribute to a balancing of social relations; they open a direct communication channel between international organisations and affected people regarding the consequences of international organisations' activities, an area where power and voice used to be the monopoly of international organisations. They can be seen as a public participation avatar, since their functioning terms and outcomes, quite different from those of judicial fora, are tailored to allow project-affected people to be heard and the harm they suffer mitigated. Like other public participation mechanisms, they are also more than a procedure or institution, providing an element of legitimation to the activities of international organizations and hinting at the rule of law.
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